Federal Court Issues Injunction in OSU Disenrollment Case Over Social Media Posts 

Timothy M. Burke, Fraternal Law Partners, tburke@manleyburke.com

On January 14, 2026, Federal District Judge A. Edmond Sargus^[1] issued a Preliminary Injunction ordering Ohio State University (OSU) to expunge any mention of involuntary disenrollment from Plaintiff Guy Christensen’s academic transcript and enjoin the university from making any equivalent representations through academic records or other means.^[2]

Christensen, a “political activist and social media influencer,” has more than three million followers on the social media platform TikTok. During the 2025 summer break (after leaving campus in late April), Christensen had posted two videos, which drew OSU’s attention. Both contain what the Court described as polarizing language related to the Israeli-Palestine conflict. At the time of the lawsuit, Christensen was attending another university and planning an international transfer, requiring a clean OSU transcript.

OSU took quick action, claiming in a letter to Christensen dated May 25, 2025, that “there is reasonable cause to believe your presence on university premises or at any university-related or registered student organization activity poses a significant risk of substantial harm to the safety or security of yourself, others, or to the property.” That communication temporarily and immediately suspended Christensen from campus. A second letter advised Christensen to set up a meeting with the Director of Student Conduct, which was ultimately scheduled to be held by video conference on June 5, 2025. Before that meeting could take place, Christensen received yet another letter from the University dated May 30, 2025, stating that he had been “disenrolled from the university.”  The letter explained that he may petition to be reinstated but “the petition must include supporting documentation or evidence that the conditions found to have existed that resulted in the disenrollment no longer exist and will not recur.” Because Christensen was disenrolled, the June 5th meeting was cancelled.

The Court ultimately found two constitutional faults with OSU’s actions. First, the disenrollment violated Christensen’s First Amendment rights. Second, his disenrollment without a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

The Court was clear in writing that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “applies to loathsome and unpopular speech with the same force as it does to speech that is celebrated and widely accepted.” Id. at *2 (citing Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty., Michigan, 805 F.3rd 228, 243 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). It continued by noting that speech on a matter of public concern “cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011)).

The Court examined “speech that causes a substantial disruption” under the standards of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969):

This case involves a public university’s response to the speech of one of its students. “[W]here state-operated educational institutions are involved, [the Supreme Court] has long recognized ‘the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.’” Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507).  At the same time, however, Supreme Court precedent “leave[s] no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.” Id. Students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.

Christensen,2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7322, at *23-24.

In the end, the Court had little difficulty in concluding that Christensen met the legal standards required to issue a Preliminary Injunction: a strong likelihood of success; that he had engaged in protected speech; that the Defendants took an adverse action against him; and that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.

The Court went on to examine Christensen’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment that he had been deprived of due process of law. Generally, the minimal requirement for basic due process is (1) notice and (2) an opportunity to be heard.  Christensen got neither before the University suspended and quickly thereafter “administratively disenrolled” him.  As the Court noted, “the fundamental requirement of Due Process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaning manner.’”^[3]

The only process OSU offered was after the fact, and then the burden on Christensen was not to prove that the videos did not warrant the disciplinary action taken, but instead that circumstances had changed and he was no longer a danger if readmitted as a student.  As the Court put it, the post-deprivation opportunity to petition for reenrollment “only afforded him the opportunity to argue that the circumstances giving rise to his disenrollment had dissipated, not that the circumstances failed to justify disenrollment in the first instance.”^[4]

In summarizing the irreparable harm issue necessary to establish Christensen’s right to a Preliminary Injunction regarding both the violation of his First Amendment Freedom of Speech right and his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right, the Court quoted Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976): “The loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreputable injury.” OSU simply ignored that long standing directive from the Supreme Court.

Before any university decides in the future to issue immediate system wide shutdowns of fraternities and sororities and do so without pre action hearings the university would be wise to recognize the rights discussed in this case or be prepared to face the consequences.

[1] Judge Sargus was once a speaker at the National Fraternal Law Conference.

[2] Christensen v. Carter, No. 2:25-cv-1062, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7322, *30 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2026)

[3]Id. at *32–33 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

[4] Id. at 35–36.